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The Right to Religious Freedom: An examination of outlawing of religious clothing or symbols 
in public and workplaces as a violation of religious freedom in the context of the decisions of 
the European court of human rights and the UN human rights committee.  
Introduction 
The rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion recognised in international human rights 
instruments, particularly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 18.  And in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 18 (1), as well as article 27 concerning the 
minorities rights in the Covenant, and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance 
and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief of 1981. In addition to the recognition of this right in all 
regional human rights instruments, including the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights Article 
9 (1). However, there are limitations clauses provided in Article 18 (3) of ICCPR and Article 9 (2) of 
the ECHR that allows states parties to restrict the right to religious, specifically the religious 
manifestations. These limitations grounded on various objectives which include; the protection of 
public safety, order, health, or moral, or fundamental rights and freedoms of the others.  
Based on these limitation grounds, there are several European countries enacted domestic laws bans 
the religious dress and symbols in public and workplace. Such bans created significant tension 
among the European countries, particularly the bans on attires that wore by Muslim women in general 
and other garments and symbols that affiliated to other religions such as skullcaps, Turban, and large 
crosses worn by Christian, Jews, and Sikh. France, for example, bans the wearing of the headscarf 
and any other religion-related clothing in the school environment, through French law regulating dress 
in public places of 2004, No. 2004-2281. Turkey also bans wearing hijab in schools and government 
workplace2. Hijab, as a term, includes many types of religious clothing worn by Muslim women. The 
headscarf that worn to cover the head and the neck. The chador was usually worn to cover the whole 
body except the face and hands. The niqab that was worn to conceal the full body and leaves the 
eyes only.  And the burqa was worn to cover the entire body, but it has a mesh screen in front of the 
                                                 
1 Oriana Mazza, Journal of Catholic Legal Studies: The Right to Wear Headscarves and Other Religious Symbols 
in French, Turkish, and American Schools: How the Government Draws a Veil on Free Expression of Faith, 
Volume 48, 2009, Number 2 Article 6, p.303 
2 Ibid, p.304 
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eyes3. The bans on religious clothing in school campus forced several students from religious 
minorities in different states in Europe to choose between being faithful to their religion, obey its 
instruction and get dismissed from school; or to disobey their religious orders and remove their 
religious dress. Several girls decided to stop going to school and lost their opportunities to study, and 
this considered the more harmful policies suffered by girls because they lose education which is a 
significant means of women empowerment4.  
The concept of secularism in France and Turkey represents the main factor behind the bans, and they 
alleged that it is necessary to separate the state from the church, and there was no one religion 
favoured over other religions in the country. In line with this concept, French president signed the 
dress code of 2004, No. 2004-228, the step that was opposed by many other states and considered 
this law would be violating the rights guaranteed in the European convention, including the United 
States5. The president asserted that the secularism should be considered at the heart of the French 
republic, and every citizen in France must believe in and be loyal to it. And based on these principles, 
students were banned from wearing religious garments in schools6. After 1989, the number of 
Muslims immigrants to France has increased, particularly people from countries were under a French 
colony, and they wear the headscarf in public in France. The French authorities considered this dress 
as a reflection on Islam identity rather than French identity that contains the culture of secularism7. 
Then, the headscarf wearers considered as foreigners who did not want to integrate with the host 
community8.  
Turkey also banned the wearing of religious attire in the public places due to the principles of 
secularism, the Turkish constitution of 2004 in article 2 stipulated that the "secularism is one of the 
main characteristics of the state9." Where the wearing of religious garments in public sphere regarded 
as an expression of religious practice which constitutes a threat to 'secularism and the neutrality of the 
public sector10' including a threat against the unification of educational system,11 particularly at the 
                                                 
3 Ibid, p.306 
4 Ibid  
5 T.Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laicite: A Comparison of the United States and France, 2004 BYU L. 
Rev. 419 (2004).  Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2004/iss2/5428. 
6 Ibid 
7 Ibid, p.456 
8 Ibid, p.457 
9 Bluebook 20th ed. Nurhan Sural, Islamic Outfits in the Workplace in Turkey, a Muslim Majority Country, 
30 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 569 (2009), p.575. 
10 Ibid, p.576 
11 Ibid, p. 571 
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universities. The Turkish constitution regulates the dress for the government personnel working in 
public institution, ‘both males and females have to work bareheaded.’12 However, all types of attires 
that covered the head or the neck were not allowed in the workplace at the government institutions13.  
Following that development, there were many other European countries, such as the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Switzerland has enacted laws bans religious dress and symbols in public and workplaces. 
The individuals who became victims of these bans challenged those before the European Court of 
Human Rights, claiming that the restrictions placed by their governments on their religious practice 
constitute violations of their right to the freedom of religion or belief guaranteed under Article 9 of the 
ECHR. In most of those complaints, however, the European Court accepted the decision made by the 
state authorities regarding the bans, and in most of these cases, the Court found no violation as 
claimed by the complainants14. In addition to that, the Court usually accepts the justification provided 
by the States parties, without independent scrutiny by the Court to determine whether such prohibition 
complies with the limitation requirements that were provided in international law15.  
Worth mentioning here is that the European Court of Human Rights grants States parties 
discretionary authority through the doctrine of the margin of appreciation. Based on this concept, 
States parties could restrict religious practise under certain circumstances16. The restriction must be 
prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim, and must be a 'necessary in a democratic society' as it 
provided in international law and European convention. It should be noted that most of the dress bans 
were based on other arguments such as the secularity of the state, neutrality of the educational 
system17, and the principles of living together18. The states parties argued that the bans laws are 
general, applies to everyone, but only those who display religious identity in public places are going to 
be affected by these laws. Such as Muslim women who wear different types of the religious dress 
(Hijab, Niqab, and Burga), and crosses and turban wore by Christians and Jews, including religious 
                                                 
12 Ibid, P.584  
13 Ibid  
14 Dahlab v Switzerland (Application No. 42393/98, ECHR 2001-V) 
15 Baljit Koone, The Veil ofIgnorance: A Critical Analysis ofthe French Ban on Religions Symbols in the Context 
ofthe Application ofArticle 9 ofthe ECH, P.53 
16 Yutaka Arai, The magin of appreciaition Doctrine and the Principle of proportionality in then Jurisprudence of 
the ECHR, Intersentia Antwerp- Oxford – New York 2001, P.2. Available: 
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=wTjOMvLpgwsC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=the+margin+of+appreciati
on+doctrine+and+the+principle+of+proportionality+in+the+echr&ots=262gy6lgAt&sig=FbIMFATVH6BZAuk22f3R
7FH1y6A 
17 S. Knights, Religious Symbols in Schools: Freedom of Religion, Minorites and Education, European Human 
Rights Law Review 5, 2005, 514.    
18 Sonia Yaker v. France, communication No. 2747/2016, para. 7.7 
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manifestation by other religious minorities. Human rights regimes stated that limitations clauses need 
to be appropriately applied, in terms of legality, necessity and legitimate aim; otherwise, restrictions 
will amount to the violation of Article 9, including violation of the right to non-discrimination and 
freedom of speech in the convention.  
The UN Human Rights Committee jurisprudence showed that the Committee applied proper scrutiny 
on the proportionality test regarding the bans on religious practice. Moreover, the Committee usually 
asks States to provide a reasonable justification that complies with the limitation clauses provided in 
human rights regimes. And, the Committee asks states to demonstrate how the wearing of religious 
clothes constituted an actual threat to the public interest as invoked by the States to restrict the right 
to religious practice.  
This research aims to examine the jurisprudence and practices of the European Court of Human 
Rights ECtHR and the UN Human Rights Committee regarding the outlawing of religious dress and 
symbols in the public and workplaces. Because, the majority of those bans were not justified under 
the European convention nor international human rights regimes, and that was due to the use of the 
wide range of the doctrine of margin of appreciation by States parties, specifically regarding cases 
under Article 9 of the ECHR. And the shortcoming of proper scrutiny by the European Court about the 
proportionality test regarding the bans resulted in a discriminatory treatment suffered by the wearers 
of religious dress or symbols. The jurisprudence of the European Court's involving this issue was 
flawed, because, the Court did not ask the States to provide reasonable justification for their 
interference in the rights of individuals to religious manifestation. This means that if the ECtHR does 
not apply strict scrutiny of how the states parties apply the limitations regime, it will not be able to 
protect minorities against majoritarian bias. Also, if the Court did not conduct proper scrutiny about 
states practice on the bans of wearing religious garments or symbols, states will continue violating the 
rights of individuals to religious practice, and the individuals will lose trust on the Court as a 
supranational judicial body.     
The significance of the study is to highlight the Court's shortcoming regarding its inadequate scrutiny 
on the application of the proportionality test, that required by the international law and European 
convention on issues involving limitation on the right to freedom of religion or belief. The study will 
reveal the court's improper scrutiny regarding the application of the proportionality test on religious 
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dress bans. Also, the study will illustrate that the lack of appropriate investigation by the Court on 
states interference in religious rights will amount to the violation of several other rights. Including 
indirect discrimination against religious minorities. The research will demonstrate the main differences 
between the Court and the UN Human Rights Committee practices regarding scrutiny on the three-
part-test when states restrict religion manifestation. The Committee applied the proportionality test 
strictly, while the Court relies on the state's justification, considering that the States parties are the 
most appropriate party to determine what represent a pressing social need that requires the restriction 
on the right to the freedom of religion or belief. The study will reveal how the Committee apply the test 
by asking states to demonstrate that religious attire constituted threat to the protection of public 
safety, order, morals, health, or the rights and freedom of others, while the Court did not subject the 
states decision to such kind of scrutiny. The study will give understanding about the relationship 
between the Court’s scrutiny and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation in relation to religious 
practice.     
Methodology:   
The methodology of this research is a qualitative one. The study conducted by scrutinising the 
primary sources that are relevant to the research topic, such as jurisprudence of European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) that involve case law on issues concerning the rights to religion manifestation, 
particularly, the restrictions on religious dress and symbols in public or workplace. Also, the study 
included the Jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee and its general comments that are 
relevant to the topic of the research. The research looked at the margin of appreciation used by 
European countries regarding religious manifestation, and to what extent, States practice in this issue 
conforms with international law regimes. That includes the international covenant on civil and political 
rights ICCPR and the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. As well as regional human rights mechanisms that include 
European convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms of 1950. 
Finally, the study advanced by looking at several relevant books, journal articles, and case law that 
are pertinent to the topic of the study.   
The outline:  
This research will be divided into five chapters,  
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Introduction: Will give an overview about the right to freedom of religion or belief grounded in 
international human rights law and European convention for human rights ECHR, the outline will focus 
mainly on the limitation clauses applied on the rights to religion manifestation provided in these 
mechanisms. The introduction will highlight the different trends between UN human rights committee 
and European court of human rights jurisprudences regarding the bans of religious dresses and 
symbols in public and workplaces, that differences refer to the application of the proportionality test. 
Also, this section will highlight the types of bans and the reasons behind the bans. Also, will illustrate 
that many of these bans were not conform with the international law regime nor European convention, 
and the Court's practices in this matter are unjustified due to the lack of proportionality test, where, 
and the Court did not ask States to provide a proper justification for such bans. 
Chapter I: This chapter will discuss the theoretical framework on the right to freedom of religion or 
belief. The discussion will include the scope of the right to freedom of religion or belief in international 
human rights law article ICCPR, Universal declaration of human rights UDHR, and the European 
convention articles 9 of the ECHR. The chapter also will discuss the direct and indirect discrimination 
on religious grounds, because, the lack of proportionality test involving such bans will amount to 
indirect discrimination on religious grounds.  
The chapter also will discuss the margin of appreciation and the relationship to freedom of expression 
and manifestation. The margin of appreciation is one of the most contentious methods used by the 
ECtHR in interpreting the convention, in some situation the Court use this doctrine to avoid giving 
required legal analysis to cases in stakes, such as the bans of religious dress and symbols without 
proportionate means and justified reason.  Also, the chapter will discuss the proportionality test and 
proper scrutiny by the ECtHR. 
Chapter II: will discuss the European Convention on Human Rights Case law concerning the bans of 
religious dress in some European countries. The discussion will focus on the European Court of 
Human Rights case law that involves bans of religious clothing and symbols in public and workplaces. 
Also, the chapter will discuss the possible reasons behind such prohibitions.   
Chapter III: will study the UN Human Rights Committee jurisprudence regarding the bans of wearing 
religious clothes and symbols in public and workplaces, this will highlight the Committee observations 
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regarding the unjustified bans on religious dress and symbols, the bans that lack proportionality test 
according to human rights regime. 
Chapter IV: will focus on comparison and analysis between European Court of Human Rights and the 
UN Human Rights Committee case law, and it will illustrate the incompatibility of European Courts 
decisions with international human rights regime on the bans of religious dress and symbols.   
Chapter V: This chapter will summarise the dissertation arguments and highlight the main points that 
illustrate whether the bans of religious dress in public or workplace meet the limitation clauses in the 
international law regime. Whether the proportionality test applied correctly; whether there is 
insufficient scrutiny by the ECtHR of the application of the test by national governments; whether 
there is indirect discrimination.  
Chapter 1 
Scope of the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Scope of Limitations in 
International Law and European Convention on Human Rights.  
1-1. Granting Clauses 
The right to the freedom of religion or belief is a fundamental human right, it is recognised in all 
human rights treaties, such as in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of human rights 1948 
(UDHR); Article 18 (1) of the International covenant on civil and political rights 1966 (ICCPR. 
Including, the recognition of this right at the regional level in Article 9 (1) of the European Convention 
for the protection of human rights 1950 (ECHR)19. All the three instruments recognise the rights to 
religious manifestation through practice, worship, observance and or teaching, either in private or in 
public, individually or in community with others, including, guarantee the rights to change religion. In 
addition to these instruments, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for religious 
tolerance after incidents of anti-Semitic in 196020.  That decision led to the draft of the UN Declaration 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief of 1981. 
Provisions of article 1 of this declaration articulate similar wording to Article 18 of the UDHR, in its 
paragraph (2) states that no one shall be coerced to adopt any religion or belief against his choice21.  
                                                 
19 Dr Alice Donald and Dr Erica Howar, The right to freedom of religion or belief and its intersection with other 
rights, A research paper for ILGA-Europe, 2015, p.1   
20 Carolyn Evans, Freedom of religion under the European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford, 2001, P.8  
21 Ibid, Dr Alice, p.2 
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During the drafting history of article 18 of the universal declaration of human rights, there were two 
major controversy issues arisen among the drafters, one of them is the inclusion of the right to change 
religion, and the other matter was the drafting of appropriate limitations clauses on the rights to 
freedom of religious practice22. Because the Islamic states among the participants during the drafting 
process and they opposed the idea that called for the inclusion of the right to change religion into the 
provisions of article 18 of the UDHR. And they argued that the right to change religion is incompatible 
with Islamic law. Despite of that, the right to change religion was included in Article 18 provisions23. 
The other challenge was whether the right to the freedom of religious practice should be subjected to 
the general limitations contained in article 29 (2), or it should be under special restrictions. However, 
most participants rejected the suggestion that the right to religious practice should be subject to 
specific restrictions24; but finally, they agreed that this right should be subjected to particular limitation 
clauses.  
1-2. The Limitations clauses 
 Beside the granting provisions, the International law and domestic constitutions included ‘limitations 
clauses’ that allow states parties to restrict the exercise of religious manifestation under certain 
circumstances25. But such restriction should comply with the restriction regime provided in Article 9 (2) 
of ECHR and Article 18 (3) of the ICCPR, which stipulated that any interference in religious rights 
must be (prescribed by the law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or 
the fundamental rights and freedom of others)26. This limitation clauses apply solely to the right to 
manifest one's religion or belief27. Historically, these clauses were found in one of the oldest and most 
important documents, that set the right to freedom of religion and non-interference, only if the exercise 
of this right contradicts to public order. That document was the French Declaration of the Right of Man 
and Citizen of 1789, which was later included in the French Constitution28.  
The five restrictions grounds mentioned in International law and the ECHR need to be interpreted 
strictly by the state authorities when decide to intervene in the rights individuals to the freedom of 
                                                 
22 Ibid, PP.35-36  
23 Ibid  
24 Ibid  
25 John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green, Religion and Human Rights: An Introduction, Oxford 2012, p. 255 
26 ICCPR, Article 18 (3). ECHR, Article 9(2).  
27 Ibid, John Witte. 
28 Ibid, p. 255 
11 
 
religion or belief. The European Court of Human Rights (as the central part of this study) should make 
proper scrutiny to guarantee that the bans on the religious practice conform to the limitation regime.  
 Restriction due to ‘public safety’ requires the existence of danger that constitute threat to the safety of 
persons such as threat life, health, security or property. For example, when religious conflict erupted 
in North Ireland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, India, or Nigeria29 state parties are required to intervene 
and restrict religious practice. Also, in situations where religions used for political purposes, 
governments might intervene and regulate religion manifestation for maintaining public safety30. But 
the argument is how for religious dress or symbol in public or workplace threat the public safety? In k. 
Singh v. Canada, the applicant, refused to remove his Turban during work due to his religious 
convictions, and he lost his job because of ‘public safety’ protection as alleged by the Canadian 
government. The applicant argued that; any risk result from his refusal to remove his turban was 
going to be confined to himself only31. In the situations of public disturbances, the state is required to 
intervene and restrict the religious practice to maintain the public order. However, the argument is 
that; how wearing headscarf, turban, and growing of beards would constitute a danger to the public 
order32? In this context, the European Court in several cases accepted justification from the states 
concerning bans on the religious dress as a threat to the public order without proper investigation by 
the Court.  
Regarding restriction for health protection, state parties are allowed to take necessary measures to 
prevent the spread of epidemics that establish a threat to the interest of public health; bans are 
allowed when religious beliefs contradict with the health of the others33. However, the argument also, 
how religious dress or symbols constitute a menace to public health? Restriction grounded on the 
protection of morals was the most controversial when it used as a justification for the state 
interference in the rights of individuals to religion or belief34. Morals as a concept it arises from Social, 
                                                 
29 Tore Lindholm, W. Cole Durham, Jr., Bahia Tahzib-Lie, Elizabeth A. Sewell & Lena Larsen.  Facilitating 
Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook, Martinus Nilhoff Publishers 2004, P.151 
30 Bluebook 20th ed. Shannon Riggins, Limitations of the Right to Manifest Religion in European Private 
Companies: Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions NV under Article 9 of the ECHR and Article 18 of the ICCPR, 33 
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 977, 1018 (2018), p.151 
31CCPR/C/37/D/208/1986, para.3  
32 Ibid, Shannon Riggins, P.153 
33 Ibid, Tore Lindholm, P.157  
34 Ibid, p.159 
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philosophical, and religious traditions. Therefore, the prohibition of wearing religious clothing or 
symbols should not be based on a single religious culture35.   
In some situations, state interference in religious rights considered necessary, particularly for 
achieving the public interests or address social pressing needs. Such as interference to settle the 
religious conflict between members of one religion or belief, for example, Jehovah’s Witnesses ‘refuse 
to give life-saving blood transfusion36’ to their sick child based on their religious faith. Or in a situation 
where there was a group of people who believe in one religion, followed their leader orders to commit 
collective suicide37.  
1-3. Definition of religion and belief 
The terms religion or beliefs have not given any definition in these international or regional human 
rights mechanisms. But the UN Human Rights Committee in its general comment 22 on article 18 
gave a broad interpretation to the wording of Article 18 of the ICCPR. The Committee stated that the 
terms ‘religion and belief’ protect ‘theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to 
profess any religion or belief.’38 And that these terms are not applied to the traditional religions only, 
but, Article 18 should be given broader interpretation to accommodate all religious and non-religious 
beliefs39. Adding to that, the ECtHR interpreted the terms ‘religion or belief widely’ to include non-
religious beliefs such as pacifism, veganism, and atheism40. The Court asserted that the philosophical 
convictions also protected under the provision of Article 9 of the convention if they achieve ‘a certain 
level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion, and importance.’ In line with this, the philosophical 
convictions should be respected in a democratic society if they do not conflict with human dignity, and 
they do not conflict with the rights and freedoms of others41.   
1-4. Forum internum and externum of freedom to religion or belief  
There are two distinctive rights guaranteed by international human rights law and European 
convention regarding the rights to the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion which are the 
absolute rights (forum internum) and the right to religious manifestation which is qualified rights (forum 
                                                 
35 The UN General Comment 22, para. 8 
36 Ibid  
37 Ibid 
38 HRC, General Comment 22, The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 18), para. 2. 
39 Ibid  
40 Arrowsmith v UK, No. 7050/75, 12 October 1978, para 69-70; veganism: W v UK, No. 18187/91, 10 February 
1993; Atheism: Angeleni v Sweden, No. 10491/83, 3 December 1986. 
41 Campbell and Cosans v UK, Nos. 7511/76 and 7743/76, 25 February 1982, para. 36. 
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externum)42. Article 18 of the ICCPR and Article 9 of ECHR guaranteed the full protection for the 
forum internum from state's interference and considered as non-derogable rights.  States parties 
cannot justify their intervention against the absolute rights43, and it means that the personal belief and 
religious creeds represent the integral parts of the rights to freedom of thought and conscience, these 
are fully protected by the provisions of Article 18 of the ICCPR and Article 9 of the ECHR.  
Evans argued that ‘the forum internum’ represents the inner personal convictions that are 
inviolable.44” While the forum externum (rights to manifest one's religion) falls under state regulation 
as stipulated in restriction clauses in Article 9 (2) of ECHR. However, (Evan 2001, p.73) added that 
even the internal dimensions of religion remain unclear because the ECtHR and Human Rights 
Commission case law showed that the Court tends to deal with the line between internal and external 
dimensions of religion as a matter of ‘self-evident.45’ (Taylor, 2005: 119) Argued that the Court and the 
Commission granted a ‘superficial’ recognition to the forum internum in cases of compulsion against 
belief. Because, the court practice was to avoid asserting that this coercion falls within the internal 
religious dimension, and that dimension will not be subject to permissible restrictions46. Several 
scholars criticised the ECtHR practice, for considering complaints involve aspects of forum internum 
under the religion manifestation. Such practice can be seen in situations where the states exercise 
the coercion against individuals’ belief. For instance, individuals forced by regulation to pay taxes (the 
applicant been forced to pay taxes that will be collected and sent to the military)47. Or abide by the 
requirements that contradict with his religious belief48.   
There were several case law regarding complaints against the violation of the right to religious 
practice, involving bans on the wearing of religious symbols or cloth in public and workplaces. 
Wearing of such dress regarded as a manifestation of religious identity that contradicts with certain 
                                                 
42 Howard, Erica. Law and the wearing of religious symbols: European bans on the wearing of religious symbols 
in education, Routledge|2012, p.16. 
43 VAN DEN DUNGEN v. THE NETHERLANDS, Application No. 22838/93, para, 1. 
44 Ibid, Howard, Erica, p.17 
45 Bluebook 20th ed. Esra Demir Gursel, The Distinction between the Freedom of Religion and the Right to 
Manifest Religion: A Legal Medium to Regulate Subjectivities, 22 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 
377, 394 (2013) P.379. 
46 Ibid, Taylor. 
47 C. v. the United Kingdom (Application No. 10358/83) 
48 Ibid, Isra Demir 
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principles in the democratic society. While the complainants considered these clothes and symbols 
are an integral part of their religion49.  
1-5. Direct and Indirect Discrimination. 
Regarding the discrimination against religious attire wearers, (Hilal Elever. The Headscarf 
Controversy, 2012, p 3) argued that there are different policies lead to different degrees of 
discriminations, intolerance toward believers who wear the religious dress or symbols in many 
countries. And this was due to the differences in national policies, cultures diversity, and variances 
regarding national constitutional orders. Therefore, it was a necessity to present these differences 
when debating the freedom of religion regarding the ‘integrity of constitutional orders.’50 Adding, these 
differences must be given due weight when assessing the scope of the state’s adherence to religious 
diversity and international human rights principles. For example, headscarf controversies showed that 
there was a weak relation between religiosity and modernity. This relation resulted in unintended 
negative consequences for Muslim women rights in modern societies, such as the legal and social 
segregation and lack of protection in international human rights and domestic constitutions against 
abuses that face Muslim women who wear the headscarf.51 It is worth noting that, remedies for such 
violation have not adequately applied as prescribed in the local laws and international human rights 
standards52. And there were several facts behind this failure, such as the lack of appropriate 
understanding regarding the motives behind wearing those religious attires; lack of tolerance and 
acceptance; misinterpretation of other cultures and religions; and political influences53.  
Direct discrimination occurs where someone treats a person less favourably than the way he or she 
treats the others on religious grounds 54. Therefore, bans of religious dress and symbols in public or 
workplace is violating the principle of equality and non-discrimination if it is not reasonably justified55. 
And it constitutes direct or indirect discrimination based on religion or belief — the application of the 
law prohibiting religious dress to all people in a community that has religious diversity may form 
discrimination if the prohibition was not proportionate to a legitimate aim56. For instance, ban Muslim 
                                                 
49 Ibid, Isra. P.380 
50 Hilal Elver, The Headscarf Controversy: Secularism and Freedom of Religion, Oxford 2012, p. 3.  
51 Ibid  
52 Ibid  
53 Ibid  
54 Howard, Erica. Law and the wearing of religious symbols: European bans on the wearing of religious symbols 
in education, Routledge|2012, pp.78-81. 
55 Ibid  
56 Ibid  
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women from wearing the headscarf in the workplace and allow nuns to wear habits or Sikhs to wear 
turbans, will constitute direct discrimination against Muslim women57. And bans wearing the headscarf 
in schools and allow Sikhs boys to wear turbans will amount to direct discrimination against Muslim 
girls on gender and religion grounds. Even the neutral school dress constitutes indirect discrimination 
on non-Christian followers, their faith might require them to dress in a specific form of clothing, and 
such bans affect disproportionately on particular people58.  
The practice of the ECtHR showed that the Court did not look regularly into the claims of violations 
raised under Article 14 of the ECHR, when it reads together with Article 9 of ECHR, because, Article 
14 considered as an accessory in the convention — adding to that the Court was not willing to admit 
discrimination-related claims59. In Aktas case and six others v. France, which involves six pupils 
alleging the violation of their rights under Article 14, the difference in treatment on religious grounds. 
The ECtHR did not consider that treatment as a violation and assured that the rules applied on them 
were to preserve neutrality and secularism within the school and to protect adolescence at the age 
that easily influenced, and to safeguard the interests of the public education system60.  
1-6. The Margin of Appreciation and the Relationship to Freedom of 
Expression/Manifestation.  
The concept of the doctrine of margin of appreciation refers to the discretion power recognized by the 
ECtHR regarding states practices on the application of limitations clauses that provided in the 
ECHR61. This concept is associated with the ECtHR as a supranational judicial body, and the Court 
depends on this doctrine to make a balance between the sovereignty of states parties and the 
necessity to secure the protection of human rights enshrined in the ECHR62. In practice, this theory 
interpreted in a way that gives national authorities a discretionary power to determine the situations 
that require states to intervene and restrict individuals’ rights. Such as in the circumstances of 
emergencies that are threating the life of people; or interference for a legitimate public policy, and the 
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protection of the rights of others, public health, morals, or public order63. Concerning the right to the 
freedom of religion or belief, states parties were granted a wide range of the margin of appreciation, 
and that is due to religious diversity64. Particularly in Europe where there was not possible to find a 
unified concept of the significance of religion in the society, and the causes of religious offences were 
different from place to place, and the states were regarded as the best to determine actions that 
guarantee the protection of the religious feelings of the others65.  
Religious manifestations in the context of the freedom of expression include various forms of religious 
practices that were amounted to restriction when that was necessary. These practices include 
individuals can pray alone or in groups; teach religion to their children; write religious works in many 
different types. Besides that, there are many other methods of expressing religious identity such as; 
religious dress, wear of religious symbols, and exercise of religious rites. All these practices involve 
freedom of expression that subject to restriction by the states using the wide range of the margin of 
appreciation66. However, there were several criticisms directed against the ECtHR reliance on the 
outcome of the state’s application of the margin of appreciation on issues where there was no 
standard mechanism agreed among states parties to apply. Many views stated that the European 
Court usually depends on the balancing test provided by the states regarding the restrictions on 
individuals rights, while the Court can make its balancing test67.  Another criticism is that the doctrine 
of the margin of appreciation is ‘not applied consistently and transparently68.’ Because the European 
Court did not conduct proper scrutiny about the state's decisions involving restrictions on the right to 
manifest the religion. In many cases, the court accepted the decisions of the state, restricting the 
rights to religion without taking independent investigation as a supranational judicial body. Regularly 
the Court decides that there was no violation of Article 9 of ECHR because the Court relies on the 
state justification. 
1-7. The Proportionality Test and the Scrutiny by the ECtHR 
            1-7-a. Prescribed by law  
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International Human Rights Law and European Convention stated clearly that any restriction on the 
rights of individuals to religious practice, must be prescribed by the law; necessary in a democratic 
society to protect the public safety, order, health, moral, and fundamental rights and freedom of 
others. The term ‘prescribed by the law’ entails three requirements. Firstly, there must be an enforced 
law stipulates precisely that certain forms of religious practice constitute a breach to the provision of 
this law, on the other word, the action by government authorities to restrict religious manifestation 
should be grounded in the law and not on the state discretion69. Secondly, the law must be accessible 
by all people under state jurisdiction, and it should be available and publicly published, meaning that 
unpublished laws, regulations, and norms should not be used to restrict the rights to religious practice. 
Thirdly, the law should be written clearly, in a way that everybody can read it and understand its 
provisions. So that when he/she practice his/, her religion understands whether his practice 
constitutes a breach to the law, the law should not be vague, arbitrary, and it should not give the state 
any discretion authority70.  
In many case law raised under Article 9 (2), complainants claim that the dress code that restricted 
their rights to the freedom of religion did not comply with the limitations requirement71. In general, 
such laws are drafted broadly to regulate religious behaviour, on which many members of religious 
minorities were targeted72. In many cases, the Court accepted that the prohibition of religious dress or 
symbols was ‘prescribed by the law.’73  
     1-7-b.   The Necessity Test  
The second part of the proportionality test is that the restriction on religious dress and symbols must 
be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ according to the purposes listed in article 9 (2) of ECHR. (Jim 
Murdoch, 2007, p.31) Argued that this principle means that the restriction must address a pressing 
social need, it must be proportionate to a legitimate aim to achieve, and the state needs to justify its 
interference.  For instance, protection of national security seems to be a strong consideration for 
‘pressing social need,’ but this does not exempt the state from providing reasonable justification for its 
actions, such as the requirements of wearing crash helmets by all motorcycle74. (Neville Cox, Behind 
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the veil 2019, p.221) Argued that justification of bans on religious dress and symbols under the claim 
of state secularism is questionable whether it passes the necessity test. Because state secularism is 
not one of the legitimate grounds that provided in international law and ECHR. For example, in Sahin 
v. Turkey, state interference was described that it lacks the necessity test, as indicated by the judge 
Tulkens75. That there was no proper evidence before the Court, to prove that the dress of Hijab in 
Turkish universities represents a threat to the public order, to the extent that Turkish secularism will 
not afford. However, there was no concrete evidence to prove that wearing of religious attire in public 
places constituted an actual threat to state secularism and open society76.  
The UN Human Right Committee and the European Court indicated that the pluralism is a 
fundamental principle that needs to be taken into consideration when states restrict the manifestation 
of religion. The Committee asserted that restrictions impose on religious expression considered to be 
necessary if it was aimed to ‘reconcile the interests of different groups and to ensure respect for the 
convictions of all.’ In doing so, the committee added that states need to be ‘neutral and impartial’ and 
work to achieve religious pluralism and best practice of democracy77.  
       1-7-c.  Legitimate aim  
States interference and restrict the rights of individuals to religion or belief must be justified with a 
legitimate objective that conforms with the five grounds provided in Article 9 (2)78. Case law showed 
that the ECtHR favour the state’s justification behind the restriction rather than considering the 
applicant's argument against the state's reasoning. ECtHR developed a ‘superficial analysis79’ for 
such precondition test. Because, the case law showed that the Court accepted justification from 
states invoking the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, public order and safety as a 
legitimate aim to ban the schoolteacher from wearing a headscarf80. Without appropriate scrutiny by 
the Court to determine how public order and safety were relevant for such restriction? In addition to 
that, individuals wore face-covering during the Carnivals and were not constituted threat to public 
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safety81. Also, people used to conceal their faces during cold weather, and they were not identified, 
and the state authorities did not consider them a threat to public safety.  
Moreover, the UN Human Rights Committee accepted that requirement of wearing headgear by 
individual working as an electrician in the railway maintenance was considered as a legitimate aim for 
the protection of public health82. Restriction on religious proselytization was considered as reasonable 
justification for a legitimate aim which was the protection of the rights and freedoms of others83. 
Concerning the limitation on the rights to religious practice to protect public morals, the UN HR 
Committee stated that the judgment on morality was not to be measured by reference to a single 
religious culture84. Taylor argued that the observation that made by the Committee on the standard of 
morality makes it impossible for the states parties to interpret Article 18 (3) in the way that it indicates 
that the public morality should be determined by the state religion or by the majority religion in the 
state 85. “Future application of "morals" grounds of limitation should take better account of the 
demands of pluralism rather than the threat posed by pluralism” Taylor emphasised86; also, it should 
include a broad explanation for the issues that requires a wide range of the margin of appreciation87.  
The next chapter will examine the European Court of Human Rights' scrutiny regarding the 
restrictions applied by states parties on the wearing of religious dress and symbols in public and 
workplace. There were Several case laws showed that the standard of scrutiny provided by Court was 
not at the level required by the international human rights regime, particularly, the Court's scrutiny on 
the application of the three-part-test. Which stated clearly that restriction on religious practice must be 
'prescribed by the law'; it 'pursue a legitimate aim'; and it is ‘necessary in a democratic society'.  
 
Chapter 2 
European Convention on Human Rights Case law. 
The European Courts of Human Rights (ECtHR) Case Law 
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The provisions of Article 9 of the European convention intended to protect the rights of the individual 
and the rights of the others in the community. This protection required law enforcement institutions to 
intervene in certain circumstances to balance between these rights to guarantee the conformity of 
individuals rights (qualified rights) with the public interest (community interests). Such balance is 
significant to avoid arbitrary state interference into the individuals’ rights to religion; also, the balance 
between rights regarded as an effective measure that determines whether the States parties 
interfering in the rights of individuals was necessary for the interest of the democratic society. Under 
protocol 9 to the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights (ECHR), individuals who 
claim violation of their rights under Article 9 of the ECHR can submit their complaints to the European 
Court of Human Rights ECtHR88. The European Court, as a supranational judicial body is authorised 
under protocol 11 to examine and determine the status of the allegations submitted by individuals 
claiming that their states violated their rights to the freedom of religion or belief, guaranteed by Article 
9 of the ECHR. The European Court has the jurisdiction to assess the grievances presented by the 
individuals in terms of admissibility and merits89. Under this jurisdiction, there were several cases 
received by the Court, but in most of these cases, the Court declares inadmissibility. Because the 
Court always accepts the reasoning provided by the state party90 behind the restriction placed by the 
state on the rights of individuals to the freedom of religion or belief, without independent scrutiny by 
the Court to balance the state allegations.  
 International Human Rights Law and the European Convention on Human Rights precisely stipulated 
that the restriction on the rights of individuals to the freedom of religion or belief must comply with the 
limitation clauses provided in International Law91 and European Convention92. These instruments 
stated that the restrictions on the right to religion or belief are not allowed only if it ‘prescribed by the 
law’, and they are ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to protect public safety, order, health, or morals 
or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others93. However, there were several cases submitted to 
the European Court by the individuals claiming that the prohibition of religious dress or symbols in 
public or workplaces, violated their rights to practice their religion. Practically, the Court did not make 
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proper scrutiny on the proportionality test (prescribed by the law, necessary in a democratic society, 
and legitimate aim) regarding such bans on religious dress. This chapter will examine the European 
Court of Human Rights scrutiny regarding the three-part-test concerning bans of religious clothing and 
symbols in public or workplaces.     
2-1. Leyla Sahđn v. Turkey  
In Sahin v. Turkey case, many commentators stated that democracy does not mean that the views of 
the majority would always prevail. But there is a need to achieve the balance between the rights of 
individuals and the public interest to guarantee the equal treatment and avoid abuses against 
minorities rights94. In assessing the necessity test in Sahin case, the Turkish authorities prohibited her 
from wearing the headscarf in public higher education. The applicant claimed a violation of her rights 
to religion or belief under Article 9, including her rights under Articles 8,10 and 14 of the ECHR, and 
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. However, the Court failed to subject the arguments of Turkish government 
to the proper scrutiny to determine how was necessary for Turkish authorities to restrict religious 
dress in higher education. Turkish government invoked that it was essential to uphold secularism and 
gender equality in the state. And considered as legitimate aims95 that required prohibition of wearing 
the Islamic headscarf in educational institutions. Undoubtedly, maintaining secularism is compatible 
with the legitimate objectives under Article 9 (2) of ECHR, which amount to the protection of the public 
order and freedom of others. Despite that, the Court did not ask the Turkish authorities to 
demonstrate practically how the wearing of Islamic headscarf would threat the secular of state? And 
how that religious attire would challenge the equal status of Turkish women’96? The Court can hear 
alternative views to balance the necessity of the prohibition, but the Court accepted the Turkish 
arguments97. Such Court position will prove the inappropriate scrutiny by the Court regarding 
justifications on such bans. 
Moreover, the Court did not criticise Turkish national courts for their interpretation that the Islamic 
headscarf is a symbol of political Islam and flag for ‘women subjugation’98. And without proper 
evidence, the Turkish authorities link hijab to the Islam extremists, in their justification for this claim 
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they stated that wearing the headscarf was supporting the Islamic extremists99. Anyhow, it is the 
responsibility for the state party to prove that such intervention is necessary and proportionate to 
achieve a legitimate aim100. But the Turkish government has failed to provide concrete evidence to 
support its arguments that wearing a headscarf in school would either lead to the collapse of the 
Turkish democracy or it influences on the applicant colleagues to dress the hijab themselves101.  
The proportionality seems to be absent in the Sahin case because there is no reasonable relation 
between the prohibition headscarf-wearing and the aim that state intended to achieve. There was no 
fair balance between the interest of the broader community and the harm inflicted on the applicant 
because of bans on religious clothing in public places. The arguments here is that if the bans policy 
intended to control Islamic extremists, then other options might be useful and proportionate too, the 
governments can enforce real punishments against the extremists. If Turkey concerned about the 
possibility of adoption of Sharia by some political parties, taking other regulations such as to resolve 
such parties might be more effective than the bans of wearing the headscarf.  
2-2. Dahlab v. Switzerland  
The complainant was a female teacher working at the primary school in Switzerland, and she wore 
the Islamic headscarf for three years. There were no complaints recorded from the pupils' parents nor 
her from the teachers about her hijab during that period102. The Directorate-General for Primary 
Education asked her to remove her headscarf during her professional duty and explain to the 
applicant that wearing religious clothes during school time was incompatible with section 6 of the 
Public Education Act. The applicant requested the directorate general to confirm such decision in a 
formal regulation. The director-general confirmed the decision and emphasised that headscarf 
constituted a clear religious identity expressed by the applicant before the pupils, and that was not 
allowed, especially in public and secular education system.103 The applicant appealed this decision 
and claimed state violated his rights religion or belief under Article 9 of ECHR. The complainant 
argued that the decision has no basis in the law, and there was no definite evidence to prove that 
wearing headscarf contradict to the public-interests104, and she complained that she was subjected to 
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discrimination based on sex. Swiss authorities grounded their ban decision on “Articles 164 of the 
cantonal Constitution of 6 November 1940 which indicates a clear separation between state and the 
church in the canton. In the educational system, this separation is given practical effect by section 
120(2) of the Public Education Act"105. Based on that, the Swiss authorities alleged that the ban was 
aimed to ensure the education system observes the principles of denominational neutrality in the 
canton. Also, the decision intended to protect the rights of pupils and their parents and religious 
harmony in the school.  
Regarding the legitimate aim, Swiss government alleged that the objective behind the bans was to 
observe ‘denominational neutrality in schools and religious harmony.106’ Concerning the necessity 
test, the state party submitted that the appellant was a public civil servant bound by special 
regulations within the country, and she represents the state in such situations. Her conduct by 
wearing hijab indicates that the state favored one religion than the other religions in the state107. The 
European Court upheld the decision made by the Swiss government and accepted that the 
interference was under the law, and the ban was to protect the neutrality of the education system 
against religious influence108. Regarding the necessity test, the Court emphasized that the contracting 
states enjoy a discretion power to intervene and restrict individuals’ rights if such rights conflict with 
the public interests. One could argue that states parties are not free to limit the rights of individuals as 
they wish, but the state parties subjected to the supervision by the Court in terms of the law applied; 
the necessity of the ban; and the purpose of the prohibitions.109   
Noteworthy in this case, some scholars commented that the Court overstepped its competencies, by 
explaining that, the Islamic headscarf does not comply with the tolerance message and the principles 
of respect of others and non-discrimination, and gender equality, that all teachers in schools should 
convey to their pupils110. By such explanation, it means that the Islamic headscarf does not conform 
with the rights guaranteed in the convention. It could better if the Court focuses on whether such bans 
considered "necessary in a democratic society.”111 Also, such interpretation by the Court suggests 
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that all women who wear the hijab were forced by their oppressive husbands to wear it, but in reality, 
women are free to choose their dress and that Muslim women activists wear headgear "as a symbol 
of defiance and not as a symbol of gender inequality."112 The Court has no jurisdiction to assess the 
Islamic faith and stigmatise it. It was expected from the Court to apply proper scrutiny by asking the 
Swiss authorities to provide concrete evidence to prove that wearing of headscarf intervened with the 
rights of others or it constituted a real threat to the public order.  
The Swiss government also alleged that wearing headscarf amounted to proselytization for Islam. 
However, the Court failed to make a balance between wearing the headscarf by a school teacher and 
the proselytization, and, there were some pupils come to school with headcover and some of their 
parents as well113.  Therefore, pupils were familiar with the headscarf. Concerning the protection of 
public order, the appellant was wearing the hijab for three years, and there were no complaints from 
the pupils or their parents and teachers; that such clothing endangers the public order as claimed by 
Swiss authorities and the court ignored this fact114. In several countries where Christian majority 
prevails, such as in the UK, some of the school teachers wore the Islamic headscarf, and it was not 
considered as a threat to the public order. Therefore, the bans, in this case, was not proportionate, 
and the ECtHR did not demonstrate proper scrutiny for the three-part-test that required by the 
limitation clauses in Article 9 (2) of the ECHR. Also, the bans considered not necessary in a 
democratic society.  
2-3 Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom  
       2-3-a. Eweida Case.  
In this case, the European Court stated there was no contradiction in procedures between the 
domestic Court and the ECtHR. The applicant was insisted to display the crosses visible as a symbol 
of her religious identity at the workplace. The crosses display proved her motive to manifest her 
loyalty to the Christian belief115. Any actions motivated by religious desire considered as a 
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manifestation of faith "in the form of worship, practice and observance that "116required protection 
under Article 9 of ECHR.  
British Airlines intended to maintain the unique company’s brand and the particular staff uniform at the 
workplace, for this reason, the company has restricted the applicant right to manifest her religion, by 
visibly she displayed crosses (the sign of Christian identity).    
Regarding the test of ‘prescribed by the law’, in the UK there was no law regulating religious clothing 
or symbols at the workplace, but private institutions have their regulation, such as the British Airways 
Company117. The company claimed that the restriction on applicant rights was pursuing a legitimate 
aim, which is to communicate a particular image of the company and to enhance recognition of its 
brand and staff. The applicant resisted this decision before the Employment Tribunal, where the 
Tribunal found that the British airways uniform code disproportionate because it failed to identify 
religious symbols from 'pieces of jewellery worn for decoration reasons.' But the Court of appeal 
described that the ban was as proportionate118. The Court accepted the legitimate aim claimed by the 
company, but there was no definite evidence to prove that wearing of other religious clothing such as 
turbans and hijabs by other employees will harm the company image or the brand119.  
The court emphasised that a fair balance between the appellant rights and the public interest was not 
achieved. The complainant insisted on displaying her religious manifestation, which is a fundamental 
right. And the healthy democratic society requires diversity and tolerance and to maintain pluralism120. 
Also, it was about the value when an individual puts his religion as an integral part of his life and 
ability to communicate that belief to others. Finally, the Court concluded that the national authority 
failed to protect the applicant rights to manifest her religion because there was no actual breach of the 
interests of the others121.   
2-3-b. The Second applicant: Shirley Chaplin v. The United Kingdom 
The appellant was a public servant, working as a nurse in a geriatric ward which it has a uniform 
working policy regulated by the ministry of health which stated: “no necklaces will be worn to reduce 
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the risk of injury when handling patients,” and any staff member want to wear religious symbols 
should get an approval from the direct manager122. Ms. Chaplin was asked to remove the religious 
symbols (cross) around her neck during work, and she refused to comply with that requirement, and 
the authority moved her to a non-nursing job. However, she complained of direct and indirect 
discrimination before the Employment Tribunal. But the tribunal dismissed her allegation of indirect 
discrimination since there was no evidence to show that she was treated less favorably than other 
staffs wished to wear religious symbols. The tribunal found that the health authority policy is 
proportionate to the aim that wants to achieve.123 The Court agreed that the applicant manifested her 
religious belief, and the health authority interfered in the applicant's freedom to religious practice124.   
In this case, the European Court needs to determine whether the restriction complies with Article 9 (2) 
proportionality and necessity test. The prohibition was to protect the health and safety of nurses and 
patients, and that was viewed as a legitimate aim.125 According to the health mangers, there is an 
actual risk that the patient may pull the cross or the chains and cause more injuries to himself and the 
nurses. And that the cross may aggravate the sickness if it meets an open wound. Also, there were 
two Sikh nurses were informed not to wear the religious dress and the flowing hijabs126. However, the 
Court admitted that the bans on wearing a visible cross must carefully weight when it involves the 
protection of health and safety in the hospital. The Court stressed that such situation requires a wide 
range of the margin of appreciation to the local authorities, particularly hospital directors were in a 
better position to judge rather than the Courts, and specifically international courts who have not 
heard direct evidence127. The court was unable to conclude that the measures against appellant' 
freedom to manifest religion were not proportionate, but the Court accepted it as 'necessary in a 
democratic society,' and there was no violation to article 9 of the convention128. However, the Court 
should make independent scrutiny to investigate the situation according to the limitation regime in 
human rights law.    
2-3-c. The third appellant: Ms Ladel v. The UK.  
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The third appellant was a Christian Orthodox, who with a strong belief that same-sex marriage is 
against God-will, and the wedding is a union between man and woman for life. She lost her job 
because such relationships are against her religious beliefs, she refused to participate in the 
establishment of an institution to support same-sex marriage, in which she assigned as registrar of 
civil partnership129. She claimed that she was subjected to indirect discrimination under article 14, but 
the Court considered the complaint in conjunction with Article 9 of the convention. The Court stated 
that religious beliefs motivated the applicant to refuse participation that supports same-sex 
marriage130.  
The domestic authorities alleged that their action was pursued a legitimate aim, which was the 
promotion of equal opportunities and principles of non-discrimination against others and that required 
all employees to act accordingly131. The court emphasised that same-sex marriage needs the same 
recognition of marriage from different sex, in terms of legal protection. In Europe, this type of marriage 
was evolving, and the countries enjoy the margin of appreciation to protect it; the national authorities 
are the best party to decide on matters involving such issues132. Therefore, the court considered the 
domestic authorities were pursuing a legitimate aim.  
Regarding the proportionality test: The Court should determine whether the means that was used by 
the state authorities proportionate to the legitimate aim. The Court stated that the appellant did not 
waive her rights to manifest religion when entered in the work contract, and the condition in question 
was introduced on a later date by the employer133. However, the Court stated that the contracting 
states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation to protect the rights contained in the convention, 
particularly in balancing the individual interest as well as collectives134. Finally, the court concluded 
that the national authorities did not overstep the margin of appreciation that they enjoy135. Als, the 
Court did not make a proper investigation by asking state party to demonstrate how the wearing of 
religious crosses endangered the health of the patients. So that the Court can determine the legal 
position of the state interference in applicant rights.   
                                                 
129 Eweida, para 102 
130 Eweida, para 103 
131 Eweida, para 105 
132 CASE OF SCHALK AND KOPF v. AUSTRIA, (Application no. 30141/04) para 62.  
133 Ibid, Eweida case, para 105 
134 Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 6339/05, para 77, ECHR 2007  
135 Ibid 
28 
 
2-3-d. The fourth applicant: Mr McFarlan v. The UK 
Mr McFarlan complained that he was subjected to disciplinary action by his employer because he 
refused to provide psychosexual counselling to same-sex couples, he refused to do that due to his 
religious convictions. He complained of indirect discrimination, and his case was rejected at all levels 
of domestic justiciability136.   
The Court asserted that his refusal merely motivated by his religious beliefs. The Court added that an 
individual accepted an employment contract knowing that the agreement contains provisions that are 
contrary to his or her religious faith. However, a balance must be struck between competing interests 
to determine the necessity of state intervention and to protect these rights137. The government 
authorities utilised the margin of appreciation to strike a balance between the appellant rights to 
manifest his religious belief and the employer’s rights and commitments to guarantee the provision of 
service to customers without discrimination. Finally, the Court concluded that there was no evidence 
to prove that the local authorities have exceeded the scope of the margin of discretion in this case138.  
2-4. Ebrahimian v France 
The applicant was employed in a temporary contract as a social assistant in the psychiatric wing of a 
public hospital in the Paris area. She lost her job due to disciplinary measures by the state authority 
following her insistence to wear the Islamic headscarf at work139. According to the particulars of the 
case, there were some complaints from the patients and the staffs regarding wearing of religious 
dress. She complained that the state authorities violated her right to freedom of religion or belief. The 
French domestic courts stated that the hospital was allowed not to renew her contract due to the 
manifestation of religion in the workplace. The French authorities claimed that the ban was aimed to 
protect the principles of secularism and neutrality of public service. The public service is understood in 
its broader sense to include the employees and private entities that provide the public services140.  
The appellant challenged the decision of the French Courts before the European Court, which upheld 
the judgment of the domestic courts. The European Court relied on its case law involving headscarf 
issue such as Sahin case, on which the states enjoy a wide range of the margin of appreciation to 
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decide on such matters. Also, the Court affirmed the secular system that became like a constitution 
that used to restrict individual rights to express their religion141. In assessing the proportionality test, it 
would be better if the Court considers the possibility of changing the post for the applicant as it 
happened in the Eweida case because such decision will affect the applicant and will not get a job in 
the whole public sector142. Many people lost their jobs, mainly Muslim women, Sikh, and Jewish men 
because of religious dress. The Court relied on the state justification, and the state enjoys a wide 
range of the margin of appreciation.  However, there was no separate assessment from the Court, nor 
critical examining the relevance of the approach took by the state in such restriction143.  
According to the facts, the Court mentioned that the applicant was in direct contact with the patients, 
and there were some difficulties regarding conducting her duties. Although, there was no clear 
evidence prove applicant conduct constituted real problem with patients or the staffs. The Court 
specified that there was a need for more explanation to identify the difficulties faced by applicant 
when performing her duties144. Many observers indicated that the abstract principle of secularism 
requires the prohibition of wearing religious clothes or symbols by public officials to guarantee the 
provision of services to customers with neutrality, and without showing their religious identity145. 
However, the abstract principle of secularism became 'a pressing social need' used regularly by 
states parties to justify restrictions on the wearing of religious symbols. And the Court, to some extent, 
accepts restriction against individuals rights based on weak assumptions, such as the guarantee of 
service provision with neutrality so that the 'patients cannot have any doubts as to the impartiality of 
those who were treating them.'146 Finally, the European Court's scrutiny regarding proportionality and 
the principle of ‘necessity’ was weak, because the Court accepted the abstract principle of secularism 
and assumptions as bases for prohibition the headscarf, instead of whether the bans were addressing 
a pressing social need such as real threat to the neutrality or the rights of others147.  
2-5. S.A.S. v. France 
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The applicant was a French national, and she wore a Muslim religious dress based on her belief and 
culture. She complained to the European Court about the French dress code of 2010 that bans the 
wearing of religious clothing in public places, has prevented her from wearing the full-face veil in the 
public sphere. She claimed that the bans violated her rights under Articles 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 14 of 
the Convention148.  Furthermore, she insisted that she wore face veil based on her choice and there 
was no pressure from anybody else to wear the Niqab. She argued that she wears the Niqab 
occasionally and did not mean to annoy other people; she intended to feel inner safety.  And always 
she was ready to show her full face when the government officials required her to display her 
identity149.  
The Court concluded that Article 9 addresses the rights of the individuals to manifest their religious 
belief, including wearing of garments and symbols affiliated to religion150. However, the Court affirmed 
that Article 9 does not protect any act motivated by religious convictions that which does not consider 
the difference in the exercise of rights in public and private places 151.  
To determine whether the personal choices fall under rights to respect for private and family life under 
Article 8 of the convention, the Court must investigate the state intervention in the applicant’s right to 
private life152. In this case, the Court identified that the way that applicant appeared in public or private 
places is an expression to her personality, and it falls under her private life,153 and state bans 
constituted intervene with applicant’s right to private life. Then the Court should scrutiny whether such 
restriction is 'prescribed by the law, pursue a legitimate aim, and is a 'necessary in a democratic 
society.'154  
Regarding the alleged violation under article 9 of the convention, the Court found that the ban 
grounded in sections 1 to 3 of the Law of 11 October 2010. However, the assumption provided by the 
state claiming that women who wear face veil were forced by their husbands and relatives to do so 
was baseless155. Because the explanatory memorandum accompanying the bill indicated that the ban 
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does not aim principally to protect women against a practice which was imposed on them or would be 
detrimental to them156.  
As for the necessity test, it was accepted that the state might regard the bans necessary for the state 
officials to be able to identify the individuals for the protection of public interests from potential 
harm157. Based on this assumption, the Court found that there was no violation of Article 9 since the 
procedures were taken for security reasons and public safety within the context of Article provision158. 
Concerning the 'legitimate aim' French authorities invoke 'protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others' the Court found that the bans law of 2010-1192 was proportionate to achieve a legitimate 
aim159. French government stated that the bans seek to create an inclusive social interaction among 
the citizens and support tolerance that required in a democratic society, and the bans of wearing the 
hijab were considered one of the tools that could be used to achieve that aim. The court upheld the 
idea and regarded it as 'a necessary in a democratic society.'160 The European Court approach to 
address complaints brought against French laws on burqa/Niqab bans contradicts to the objectives of 
human rights regimes. There are inconsistencies in the discussions, analysis, and ruling regarding 
several cases. The Court reiterated in both articles 8 and 9, the ‘protection of rights and fundamental 
freedoms of others’ emphasis on its significance, however, in supporting the bans of religious dress, 
French authorities protect rights and freedoms of others without precise scrutiny to protect rights and 
freedoms of minorities.  
The next chapter will examine the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee in terms of its 
scrutiny on the bans on religious dress and symbols in public or workplace.  The chapter will illustrate 
how the Committee scrutinises the proportionality test regarding the bans in some of the European 
countries. The chapter will argue that the Committee will not accept that States to interfere in the 
rights of individuals without a reasonable justification that complies with the limitation clauses 
provided in the human rights regimes.  
Chapter 3 
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Human Rights Committee case law 
The UN Human Rights Committee is authorised to monitor the implementation of the rights contained 
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. To do that, the Committee examines the 
reports provided by the States, particularly the measures taken by the state to implement the 
covenant's rights, and monitors the progress made by the States in the realisation of the enjoyment of 
those rights161. The Committee gives its comments on the State's report through the concluding 
observations which include recommendations such as reviewing the state laws to comply with the 
ICCPR. And, to guarantee that the state’s domestic application complies with the provisions of Article 
2 of the Covenant162. Besides that, the Committee publishes General Comments aimed to enhance 
the effective implementation of the ICCPR, through the highlight the deficiencies in the state's report, 
and to encourage the states parties and the international organisation to promote the protection of 
human rights163. Concerning Article 18, the HR Committee emphasised that its General Comment on 
Article 18 should be reflected in the state’s ‘policy and practice’ and given consideration when states 
parties prepare their reports164.  
The UN Human Rights Committee an essential supervisory tool for the implementation of the ICCPR. 
Under Article 2 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
Committee receives communications from individuals who claim a violation of their rights to freedom 
of religion or belief165. And that will be after the exhaustion of the domestic remedies. Based on this 
jurisdiction, the Committee received several complaints from the individuals challenging the decisions 
of their governments concerning the bans laws that restrict the wearing of religious dress and symbols 
in public or workplaces. The complainants regarded such restriction as a violation of their rights to the 
freedom of religion or belief. This chapter will discuss the UN Human Rights Committee jurisprudence; 
the discussion will focus on the Committee's scrutiny of the proportionality test regarding the 
prohibition of wearing religious clothes and symbols in the public and workplaces in Europe.            
3-a. Hebbadi v France,  
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The author was a French national and Muslim woman who wears the niqab, the police stopped her for 
identity checks while she was walking in the street, after that, she was charged and prosecuted for a 
minor offence which is the wearing garments conceal her face in public place 166. And she was 
ordered by the community Court in Nantes to pay 150 Euros as a maximum penalty applied according 
to Article 1 and 2 of the Act No. 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010. Noting that ‘the decision of the 
community court was not subject to appeal.’167 Where the French authorities alleged that the bans 
aimed to protect the public safety and public order, and to protect the rights and fundamental 
freedoms of others.  
The applicant challenged the French authority’s decision before the national courts, and she claimed 
that the bans on full-face veil in public space deprived her the freedom of choice to wear garments as 
she wishes. And she submitted her complaint under Article 18 of the Covenant168. She argued that the 
French Act No. 2010-1192 did not conform to the provisions of article 9 of the European convention 
that guarantee individuals the rights to manifest religion. She requested from the criminal chamber of 
the Court of Cassation to review the decision of the community court judge on her case. and she also 
claimed that the bans law is discriminatory because it 'undermined pluralism by discriminating against 
a minority practice of the Muslim religion.”169 The cassation court rejected her application on the basis 
that the community Court judgment is not subject to appeal.   
The committee conclusion.  
Finally, the applicant challenged the domestic courts' decisions before the HR Committee. According 
to its general comment No. 22, the Committee found that the author act represents religious 
practice,170 and the bans constitute restrictions of applicant rights to manifest her religion or belief 
within the meaning of Article 18 (1). Then the Committee needs to determine whether such restriction 
follows the limitations regime contained in Article 18 (3) of the ICCPR. Which provided that any 
restriction on religious practice must be 'prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, 
order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.'171 Moreover, the Committee 
emphasized that the provisions of Article 18 (3) need strict interpretation, and there were no other 
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grounds for restriction rather than those mentioned in Article 18. Furthermore, the Committee 
stressed that the restriction must be proportionate to a legitimate aim and should not be applied in a 
discriminatory manner or for inequitable purposes172. On the other side, the French authorities alleged 
that the restriction was aimed to achieve a legitimate objective, mainly, the protection of public safety; 
public order; and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.   
Regarding the principle of ‘prescribed by the law’ the Committee found that the prohibition falls under 
the scope of article 1 of the French Act No. 2010-1192. As for the public safety and order; the State 
party claimed that the restriction would help the government authorities to identify individuals when 
necessary to guarantee public security and combat identity fraud. The Committee agreed that in 
certain circumstances, individuals would be required to reveal their faces, such as during the 
procedures to prevent risk for public safety or order, and identity purpose173. However, the Committee 
observed that the French bans code is not limited to specific circumstances and always prohibits a 
particular dress (face veil). The Committee also found the state authorities were not able to 
demonstrate that the full-face covering poses a real threat to the public safety or public order so that 
the ban would be justified 174. Also, there was no reasoning from the state to explain why it prohibits 
the wearing of the full-face veil and allows to face-covering in other purposes such as sport, artistic, 
other traditional faith; and there was no example of the expected threat175.  
Furthermore, the State party failed to provide evidence to show that there was an imminent threat to 
public safety. Also, the state was unable to prove that the prohibition contained in Act No. 2010-1192 
consistent with the legitimate purpose that the state authority aimed to achieve. There was no effort 
from the state to prove that the ban was the least necessary measures adopted to meet that aim176. 
Moreover, the state did not show the rights of others that are affected by the wearing of the face veil, 
including persons. Finally, the committee stated that the limitations provided in article 18 (3) need to 
be interpreted strictly but not abstractly177. The committee found that the state violated the rights of 
the applicant guaranteed by Article 18 of the covenant.  
3-b. Sonia Yaker v. France, 
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The applicant is a Muslim woman who wore a full-face veil, and the French police stopped her and 
asked about her identity for security reasons178. The face veil wearing was not allowed by the law; 
therefore, she was prosecuted under the provisions of Act No. 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 
because she wore the veil that concealed her face in the public place. However, she challenged the 
bans decision and claimed that the state authorities violated her rights under Articles 18 and 26 of the 
ICCPR, she argued that the bans indicate the failure of her government to provide her with the equal 
protection before the law, and the right to non-discrimination. She added that the headscarf-wearing 
represents a religious practice for a particular religious group of Muslims 179. 
On the other hand, the French authorities claimed that the restriction was grounded on the protection 
of 'public safety' and 'living together’180 . The UN Human Rights Committee stated that there was no 
dispute that the prohibition was applied according to the law 'prescribed by the law' and the Act No. 
2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 was the legal basis for the bans.  Regarding the protection of ‘public 
safety,’ the Committee accepted that states parties would need to guarantee the public safety, and in 
certain situations, individuals will be asked to remove their full-face veil and show their identities for 
security checks181. But also, the state authorities will be required to justify their interference in the 
rights of individuals, and to prove that the wearing of full-face covering constitutes a threat to public 
safety. But the Committee observed that French government authorities failed to justify that the ban 
was necessary to address pressing social conditions182.    
Additionally, the French authorities alleged that the restriction was aimed to protect the concept of 
'living together' and this concept requires individuals to show their 'readiness to be identified' but not 
to conceal their faces. In this regard, the Committee stressed that the restrictions grounds provided in 
Article 18 (3) must be interpreted strictly, and the principle of 'living together’ was not mentioned 
among the limitation grounds provided in Article 18 (3). Finally, the committee found that the ban is 
discriminatory because the law that imposed the restriction was drafted as a general law, that should 
be applied to all people, but practically, it applies only on women who wear the full-face veil183.   
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3-c. Bikramjit Singh v. France 
The complainant was practising Sikh belief, he was living in France, and he went to attend school 
wearing ‘keski’ which is a 'black piece of cloth’ worn by Sikh men to cover the head and protect their 
hair. The school administration refused to allow him to enter the school premises wearing a religious 
dress that reflect his religious identity. And the school authorities considered the cloth wore by the 
applicant as ‘a sacred, inherent and intrinsic part of the religion’184. In addition to that, the school 
administration allocates a separate place for the applicant to attend his lessons, and he was not 
allowed to attend the classes with the rest of the students. Finally, the school authorities expelled him 
permanently from the school, reasoning that the applicant did not comply with the school regulations, 
and the wearing of religious attire constitutes a breach of Act No. 2004-228 of 15 March 2004185. 
Furthermore, the state authorities stated that wearing religious garments or symbols by teachers or 
pupils was prohibited by the law, in order to implement the state policy to protect the secular 
education system. Also, French authorities alleged that the restriction on applicant religious rights was 
intended to defend the secularism; the interests of pluralism; rights and freedoms of others; and 
neutrality in public education186.  
The applicant challenged the decision of the French authorities before the UN Human Rights 
Committee; the appellant claimed that the state authorities violated his rights guaranteed by Articles 
18 and 26 of the ICCPR. According to the case particulars, the Committee emphasized the 
importance of secularism protection within the state education system. The Committee added that the 
protection constitutes a legitimate aim, particularly, protection of rights and freedoms of others and 
protection of the public order and safety187. Despite that, the Committee found that the state 
authorities’ interference into the applicant rights was not necessary and not proportionate, because 
the government authority was not able to prove that the wearing of Keski by the applicant endangered 
the rights and freedom of others or represented an actual threat to the public order188.  
Worth mentioning that, the Committee stated that the state authorities subjected the complainant to a 
harmful sanction by expelling him permanently from the school, the reason was not because of his 
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conduct but because of his affiliation to particular religious category189. And the state was not able to 
provide a justified reason for its action against the applicant, and this led the Committee to conclude 
that, the French authorities violated the applicant’s rights guaranteed by Article 18 of the ICCPR. Also, 
the Committee emphasised that the permanent expulsion of the applicant from the school was not 
proportionate to the legitimate aim alleged by the state, and it constitutes severe damage to the 
applicant educational development, where everyone has right to education190.   
3-d. Ranjit Singh v France 
The applicant is an Indian national, and he got refugee status in France, he applied to renew his 
residence permit and provided the French authorities two photographs. In these photographs, he 
appeared wearing a Sikh turban (religious dress) that covers some parts of his head191. The French 
authorities refused to accept that photos that he provided, the state alleged that the photos did not 
meet the requirements stipulated in the French Decree article 11-1 of Decree No. 46-1574 of 30 June 
1946192, the decree that regulates the situations of foreign nationals apply to obtain a French 
residence permit. The decree specified ‘that individuals must appear full face and bareheaded on the 
photographs destined for the residence permits’.193 The appellant requested the concerned 
government officials to relieve him from the conditions that forced him to remove the turban from his 
head, which was incompatible with his religion or belief194.  
The state authorities rejected his application because it did not satisfy the requirements for residence 
permit renewal stipulated in French decree. After the exhaustion of the domestic remedies, the 
applicant appealed the French courts' decision before the UN Human Rights Committee, and he 
argued that the French authorities’ requirements regarding full-face and bareheaded photograph for 
renewal residence permit were disproportionate and not necessary to the aim of protecting the public 
order and safety that alleged by the government authorities195. He contended that the state authorities 
did not refuse to issue residence identity with ‘a beard covering half of the face’ and he claimed that in 
many other European countries, specifically in Belgium, Germany and Italy such requirements did not 
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exist. He alleged that in those countries, the state authorities used to issue identification cards for 
individuals wore a turban and how they can be identified holding their identities with turbans in these 
countries while they cannot be identified in France? Moreover, he appealed that it is easy for the state 
officials to recognize the applicant with an identification card wearing a turban since he used to wear 
the hat all the time. Finally, the complainant alleged that he was subjected to discrimination based on 
his religion because he was forced to choose between his religious duties and access to public 
services196.  
The state alleged that the residence cards requirements were necessary measures that enable state 
authorities to combat the falsification and fraud attempts. Therefore, it was essential requirements for 
individuals to submit photographs show their heads clearly in their cards so that it can be easy to 
identify them when required. The HR Committee stated that there were no challenges face the state 
authorities when they want to check individuals’ identities for security reasons197. Usually, during daily 
life, people used to appear different than the way they look in their identity cards, and there was no 
evidence to show that the persons who wore turban involve in crimes of fraud or falsification198. All 
these issues raised by the UN human rights committee, and there was no justification provided by 
state authorities, and finally, the committee observes that the state has failed to justify its interference, 
and the Committee concluded that the does not comply with the limitation clauses contained in article 
18 (3) of the ICCPR199.  
The next chapter will focus on the comparison and analysis between European Court of Human 
Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee case law, and it will illustrate the incompatibility of 
European Courts decisions with international human rights regime on the bans of religious dress and 
symbols. 
Chapter 4 
Case law of the UN Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights: 
comparison and analysis. 
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This chapter will provide an analysis of comparable cases before the UN Human Rights Committee 
and the European Court of Human Rights in relation to the wearing of religious dress in public places. 
It will argue that key differences in the rulings emerge for a differing level of scrutiny used by the two 
bodies.  
Some of the rulings by the UN Human Rights Committee the cases involving the rights to freedom of 
religion or belief under Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were 
different from the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on the similar issues under Article 
9 of European Convention on Human Rights. The main reason is that the Committee does not use the 
‘margin of appreciation’ The doctrine that relied on by the European countries in balancing the 
individuals' rights and the public interests of the state in general, particularly on issues where there is 
no standard among the states.  
For example, in 2012, in Yaker v. France, two women wore a full-face veil; was stopped by; the police 
for an identity check. Finally, they were fined with 150 Euros and charged with the violation to The 
French law, Act No. 2010-1192 that stipulates “No one may, in a public space, wear any apparel 
intended to conceal the face [unless the apparel is] authorized by law or justified for health or 
professional reasons, sports practices, festivities or artistic or traditional manifestations.200” After the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies, the two victims submitted their complaints to the ECtHR and 
claimed that French authorities violated their rights guaranteed under article 9 of the convention, 
where the court dismissed the case as inadmissible with no specified reasons. By contrast, the UN 
Human Rights Committee found that the complaint was admissible despite the challenge from the 
French authority claiming that France put a reservation on individual communications to the UN 
committee201, and supporting the ECtHR decision of inadmissibility of the case in question. In this 
case, the HR Committee indicated that the ECHR did not mention the grounds of inadmissibility in its 
decision so that the applicant understands the circumstances led to ineligibility to his case202. 
However, according to the particulars of the case, the HR Committee found the complaint was 
admissible203.  
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Regarding the HR Committee’s decision, it should be noted that, the complaints are identical, and in 
both cases, the applicants alleged that the sentences handed down against them constitute a 
violation of their right to freedom of religion or belief under Article 18 of the ICCPR and their right to 
equality before the law under Article 26 of the ICCPR204. They argued that Act No. 2010-1192 of 
France treat them distinctively from the rest of the population by restricting their rights to freedom of 
movement; they became unable to interact freely with the community due to the dress code205. The 
law did not explicitly target Muslim, but the applicants managed to show that many individuals 
affected by the bans are the Muslim minority, which indicates that the law is discriminatory206. In both 
cases, the committee concluded that the decision of the French authorities to prohibit the 
concealment of one's face in public places constituted interference in the applicants right to the 
freedom of religion under the meaning of article 18 of ICCPR207. The French Act No. 2010-1192 
forced the applicant to choose between giving up manifesting their beliefs or face the punishment. 
a- ‘Necessary in a democratic society’  
The State authorities argued that the bans are necessary to protect both the rights of others and 
public safety and order, and the committee recognised that in certain circumstances it might be 
essential to check individual’s identities through seeing their faces for security reasons208. But the law 
constituted a blanket ban not limited to those situations only; therefore, it is not proportionate to the 
objectives that State officials claimed that the law aimed to achieve. The State party has argued that 
the concept of 'living together'209 is a legitimate aim that drives the government to restrict the rights of 
individuals in order to realise it, but the Committee clearly stated that the grounds for restrictions 
provided in Article 18 should be interpreted strictly and that the concept of “living together” is very 
vague and abstract.210  According to the Committee scrutiny of the case, the State party failed to 
establish a reasonable connection between the fundamental rights of others and the effect of wearing 
the full-face veil on those rights. 211 Finally, the Committee decided that the bans imposed on the full-
face cover by State authorities were not ‘necessary in a democratic society,’ and was not 
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proportionate to achieve a legitimate aim as alleged by the local authorities. It, therefore, held that the 
convictions imposed on the applicants constitute a violation against their rights for freedom to religion 
guaranteed under article 18 and the right to ‘non-discrimination’ in Article 26 of the ICCPR.212 The law 
disproportionately affected Muslim women wearing the full-face covering and presented unfair 
treatment toward them in comparison to those who are permitted to cover their faces as exceptions 
under by Act No. 2010-1192213.  
b- The European Court decisions on ban of religious dress and symbols  
In S.A.S v. France, the applicant was a Muslim woman who wore the full-face veil. She claimed that 
she wore it as her choice and that wearing it was according to her religious conviction. However, in 
2004 the French authorities enacted a law that banned the wearing of religious dress that concealed 
an individual's face in public places. The applicant claimed that the dress code prohibited her from 
wearing clothes that she chose to wear and that the law violated several other rights including the 
right to freedom of religion and belief guaranteed under article 9 of ECHR214. About the claim under 
Article 9, the court found that the state action constituted an interference in the complainant rights to 
freedom of religious practice, on which the court needed to investigate whether such intervention met 
the restriction clauses. It maintained that the State intervention must be “prescribed by law,” pursues 
a legitimate aim, and should be “necessary in a democratic society,” as it provided for in the second 
paragraph of article 9 of the convention215.  
c- ‘Legitimate Aim’ 
Regarding the principle of 'prescribed by the law,’ the Court found that the bans were introduced by 
Law no. 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 and met that particular requirement. Therefore, the Court 
focussed on the other two principles i.e. legitimacy and necessity.  Concerning the need to meet the 
criterion of a legitimate aim, the State party pushed with two objectives 'public safety', and 'respect for 
the minimum set of values of an open and democratic society': the state considered them as a 
legitimate goal and intended to protect these interests by such bans216. The public safety enumerated 
in article 9; but the second goal that claimed by the state was not mentioned in the provisions of 
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Article 9, and to some extent, it linked to the protection of 'rights and fundamental freedoms of others' 
within the meaning of the second paragraph of the article. The court interpreted in some situations, 
"respect for the minimum requirements of life in society" or "living together" relate to "protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others"217.  
d- ‘Necessary in a democratic society.’  
Regarding the criterion of a limitation being ‘necessary in a democratic society,’ the right to freedom of 
religion and belief is considered as one of the fundamental freedoms for democratic societies. 
However, the court stated that article 9 differentiates between the conduct related to this right and the 
beliefs itself218. It noted that the provisions of this article did not protect every act that was motivated 
by religion or convictions, and it does not assure that individual a right to behave in the public space 
as the way they might behave in their private sphere219. The concepts such as "pluralism, tolerance, 
and broadmindedness" are considered as features of the democratic society. Although, democracy 
does not mean that the majority views prevail, it requires a balance must be made between the rights 
of individuals and the public interest, with the minorities given equal treatment with the majority220. 
The court examined the state allegation that women wear the full-face veil under duress, and the 
court found this claim is baseless221. But removing the cloths that conceal the face for security 
reasons as claimed by the state authorities, the court considered as necessary for a legitimate aim, 
which is the interest of public safety222. Therefore, the court found that there was no violation of article 
9 as long as there is an obligation to remove religious garments for identification and security 
necessities223.  
The court's scrutiny regarding state justification was weak because the state did not provide any 
evidence that the rights and freedoms of others have been affected by the wearing of the full-face veil. 
Several judges argued that the bans affected the abstract principles contained in the convention such 
as religious and cultural identity, and it was not proportionate to the legitimate aim alleged by the 
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State party224. And this emphasises that such prohibitions are not considered 'necessary in a 
democratic society,' and the allegations regarding respect for dignity and equality between men and 
women [are/should] not deemed legitimate to justify the bans225. Moreover, the protection of persons, 
properties and the fight against fraud on identity could be a legitimate aim required individuals to 
remove their face veil, but this can be a proportionate only in situations of the real general threat to 
public safety226.  
e- No proper scrutiny by the ECtHR 
In many case laws involving the removal of the religious garments due to the security check 
processes and for identity photos; the ECtHR and the UN Human Rights Committee reached different 
conclusions227. The main reason behind that is the European Court did not conduct proper scrutiny 
regarding the state's justifications for its interference in individual’s rights. The court relies on the 
state's decisions on issues in question, and this is due to the wide margin of appreciation that is given 
to states to solve matters where there is no commonly agreed standard among countries228. In Mann 
Singh v. France, the European Court of Human Rights dismissed the application and decided that the 
case was manifestly ill-founded. The French authorities required the complainant to remove his turban 
and provide them with identity photos229. He claimed that this request constituted an interference with 
his right to privacy and his rights to freedom of religion230. The Court concluded that the State 
interference in the applicant’s rights was justified and proportionate to support the public interests, 
law, and order231. The applicant later challenged this decision before the UN Human Rights 
Committee claiming that French authorities violated his rights guaranteed under articles 18 and 26 of 
the ICCPR. He argued that the requirements for identity photos are not necessary nor 
proportionate232. The Committee observed that the applicant wears a turban that covers the top of his 
head and some forehead but leaves his face visible, but local authorities did not explain why it was 
challenging to identify him when he was wearing it, given the fact that he always wore a turban in his 
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daily life233. Besides, the state authorities did not explain how bareheaded identity help the authorities 
to identify their holders when the holders of these cards always wear turbans in public places, 
throughout their daily lives; or how it helped the authorities to combat fraud and falsification234.  
Requiring an individual to remove his turban and submit a photo for identity purpose is considered 
neither proportionate nor necessary. This is because, if the applicant obtained an identity card with a 
bareheaded photo, then he will be required regularly to remove his turban for security and identity 
checks. And this will constitute a violation of the individual's religious rights if there is no convincing 
justification on the part of the state, and his religious convictions require that the turban be worn all 
the time235.  
f- Schools and Public Institutions 
The jurisprudence of the European court and the UN Human Rights Committee regarding the 
prohibition of religious dress and symbols in schools and public places took two different paths. 
Teachers and students submitted several cases to the Court claiming a violation of their rights to 
freedom of religion, but the court dismissed them by declaring inadmissibility or non-violation of Article 
9 of ECHR. In Kurtulmus v. Turkey, involving the dismissal of a University teacher from her job 
because of wearing the Islamic headscarf, the Court agreed with the decision of the State authorities 
that wearing headscarf was a threat to the secularism and that the Turkish constitution guarantees, 
and to the principle of secularism. Therefore, the Court found no violation of Article 9236. The same 
judgment was applied to the case of Sahin v. Turkey where the Court relied on the principles of 
secularism237.  In Ebrahimian v. France case, the Court found no violation and agreed with the local 
authority not to renew the contract of a social worker in a public hospital because the applicant 
refused to stop wearing the Islamic headscarf238. The Court relied on its previous case law and 
agreed that the religious dress in the workplace was a threat to the principle of the secularism, 
accepted the state claimed to protect the rights and freedoms of others, and that the action was 
necessary to maintain the neutrality of governments officials to guarantee the equal delivery of 
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services and treatment for patients239. As for the proportionality of the bans with a legitimate aim, the 
Court accepted the State’s claim that the government employees are not allowed to disseminate their 
religious convictions while performing their professional duties240.  
In all these cases, the European Court and the HR Committee reached different conclusion.  For 
example, in case of Raihon Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, the Committee considered that expulsion 
of the student from the school because she refused to remove her hijab while attending her class, 
was a violation of the applicant’s rights to freedom religion or belief since the state did not provide a 
reasonable justification for its interference241. Also, it found coercion against the applicant's freedom 
to adopt faith or convictions according to his or her choice. In the case of Bikramjit Singh v. France, 
the HR Committee emphasized that the restriction was ‘aimed to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others’242, public order and safety. The state alleged that the bans sought to tackle the phenomenon 
of religious dress that created tensions and harassments in the schools243. Despite that, the HR 
Committee held that the interference was not justified because the state failed to demonstrate how 
the wearing of religious dress by the applicant endangered the rights or freedoms of others at the 
school. Also, there was no evidence that the permanent expulsion from school would serve the best 
of the public interests or that it was the last restrictive measure244. The lack of evidence led the HR 
Committee to decide that there was a violation of the applicant rights under article 18 of the ICCPR.  
As the foregoing shows, two different human rights systems reach differing conclusions on 
comparable cases regarding the restriction of the right to manifest religion or belief regarding the 
wearing of religious clothing in public spaces. Across a range of cases a common pattern emerges, 
and that is that the Human Rights Committee applies a higher level of scrutiny of State actions and 
demands more specific evidence to establish necessity. The European Court however, under the 
doctrine of ‘margin of appreciation’ is less stringent in its scrutiny of the necessity requirement. In 
some cases, the Court has also been more willing than the Committee to accept arguments put 
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forward by the State on the legitimacy criterion too, as in the case of protecting a right to living 
together in the SAS v France case. 
The next chapter will summaries the key arguments of the dissertation and highlight the main points 
that illustrate whether the bans on religious dress in public or workplace in some of the European 
countries meet the limitation clauses in the international law regime. The conclusion will show whether 
the proportionality test been applied properly; whether there is insufficient scrutiny by the ECtHR of 
the application of the test by national governments; and whether there is indirect discrimination.  
Conclusion. 
As well illustrated that the right to the freedom of religion or belief recognized in all international 
human rights mechanisms, including the regional instruments for the protection of human rights such 
as the European convention. Article 18 of the ICCPR and Article 9 of the ECHR245 provided granting 
clauses as well as limitations clauses. There were two issues arisen during the drafting history of the 
Article 18 one involved the inclusion of the right to change one's religion, while the other one was the 
imposition of restriction clauses on the rights to manifest religious practice.  
Regarding the limitations clauses, international law and the European convention precisely provided 
that restriction on religious practice is only allowed if it is grounded in the three-part test contained in 
these instruments; prescribed by the law, pursue a legitimate aim, and necessary in a democratic 
society (Article 18 (3) ICCPR, and Article 9 (2) of the ECHR). According to these instruments, the 
legitimate aim means that the restriction should be justified that it protects public safety, order, health 
or morals or the fundamental rights and freedom of others246. However, many European countries 
enacted laws that restrict the right to the freedom of religious practice in public and workplaces. But 
the application of these laws affected several people because they wear religious attire and believe 
that these garments represent an integral part of their religion. There were many complaints 
submitted before the European Court of Human Rights, alleging that their governments violated their 
rights to the freedom of religion manifestation guaranteed by the European convention. It is quite 
noticeable that the complainants before the European Court are individuals from religious minorities, 
which include Muslim women who generally wear the hijab (Headscarf, Burga, Veil), Sikh people who 
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wear Turbans, and Christians who display crosses. This dissertation examined the jurisprudence of 
the European Court in terms of standard of scrutiny by the Court regarding the decisions of the state 
authorities on the bans of religious dress in public and workplaces. The conclusions of this research 
showed that the European Court practice in investigating the bans decision was flawed because the 
Court accepted the judgements provided by States parties on this matter, without making independent 
scrutiny about those decisions to guarantee that it conforms to the limitation regime in human rights 
law. Also, the findings presented that there was no dispute that the bans were made according to the 
principle 'prescribed by the law.' But the other two conditions required independent scrutiny by the 
Court, to guarantee that the restriction does not constitute a violation to the right of individuals to the 
freedom of religion or belief. Practically, there was no proper investigation demonstrated by the Court 
in many cases ruled under the Court jurisdiction. For instance, usually, States parties invoke the 
secularity of the state and gender equality as a legitimate aim to restrict the right of individuals to 
manifest their religion. States alleged that the wearing of religious dress in public or workplace 
constituted a threat to the secularism and endangered the principle of gender equality247. The Court 
accepted that sustaining secularism and achieving gender equality was considered a legitimate and 
maintaining them requires states parties to adopt measures to protect them. But in general, the Court 
did not ask states parties to demonstrate how the wearing of such attire hinder secularity of the state 
and affect the gender equality principle, and there was no evidence to show that such restriction was 
required to address a pressing social need248.  
The study found that one of the reasons that make the European Court accept the justification from 
states parties regarding bans on the religious dress or symbols without further investigation by the 
Court was that the Court granted states parties discretion power through the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation. This concept allows state authorities to strike a balance between the rights of individuals 
and the public interests of the community, and this doctrine applied to issues where there was no 
agreed universal standard or practice among the states parties to be applied. And the prohibition of 
wearing religious clothing and symbols in public places was one of the matters that subjected to the 
margin of appreciation. Therefore, the Court did not properly investigate the main reasons and 
motives behind states interference in the rights of individuals to freedom of religious manifestation. It 
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was also noted that the Court relied on the decisions of States concerning the bans because the 
Court believes that States are best to determine what would constitute a pressing social need 
Unlike the UN Human Rights Committee, in all cases submitted before the Committee, there was 
proper scrutiny on States decisions regarding the bans on wearing religious attire and symbols in 
public and workplaces. In its case law, the Committee asks the state to provide a reasonable 
justification behind the bans that affect the rights of individuals to religion. And also, it asks States to 
demonstrate how the wearing of religious garments constituted a threat to the protection that alleged 
by the State. The Committee also investigates whether the measures were taken by the State were 
proportionate to a legitimate aim. And whether such actions were the least necessary measures to be 
made by the state to meet that lawful purpose. The Committee stated that the restrictions contained in 
Article 18 (3) of ICCPR need to be interpreted strictly within the meaning of the covenant and not 
abstract interpretation249. It was expected from the Court to stress on whether the action put forward 
by the State to restrict the rights was proportionate to the legitimate aim or not. For example, in 
circumstances where the State authorities refused to issue an identity card for the applicant because 
he refused to remove his turban due to his religious beliefs250. The Committee concluded that the 
State authorities failed to demonstrate that the issuance of identity card with bareheaded photograph 
was necessary to fight the fraud and falsification attempts. The Committee also stressed the fact that 
the applicant wears the turban all the times and argued that it was not rational to issue an identity 
card with bareheaded-photo for someone who wears a turban through all his life. And it will be easy 
for the State authorities to identify him with his identity card wearing turban whenever required for 
security check. However, such scrutiny proved that the State action was not proportionate to aim that 
invoked by the State. While the European Court did not subject state interference in the rights of 
individuals to guarantee that such procedures were proportionate to the aim alleged by states.  
The bans on religious clothing and symbols would violate several other rights in the convention 
including indirect discrimination if the Court did not apply proper scrutiny about the bans in terms of 
the proportionality test. The study found out that the bans laws are general laws that were drafted 
broadly and applied to all people, but in reality, these laws affect disproportionately on specific 
individuals, and mainly persons of religious minorities such as Muslim women, Sikhs, Jews and 
                                                 
249 Ibid, Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan 
250 Ibid, Mann Singh v. France.  
49 
 
Christian. The lack of appropriate scrutiny by the Court resulted in that many girls lost their 
opportunity to education. Because the ban laws forced them to choose between the removal of their 
religious dress and continue their education or remain loyal to their religious orders and lose their 
education opportunities. Several other individuals lost their jobs because of ban laws that were 
applied against the wearing of religious dress or symbols in public or workplace. There was a clear 
difference between the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence and the UN Human Rights 
Committee in terms of scrutiny for the proportionality test regarding the bans on the religious 
manifestation in some of the European countries. The Committee applied proper scrutiny for the 
three-part-test as it provided in human rights regime, while the Court usually relied on its previous 
case law and the justification provided by the state authorities. Because the Court considers States 
are the best to determine situations that constitute a pressing social need, and that requires states to 
intervene and restrict the rights of individuals to achieve public interest, without a proper examining by 
the Court on the bans in such situations.  
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